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ENFORCING THE DECISIONS  
OF “THE PEOPLE”  
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMEND-
MENTS: THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS. By 
Yaniv Roznai.1 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2017. Pp. 
xxiv + 334. $75.00 (cloth). 
Joel I. Colón-Ríos2 
Constitutional amendments can be “unconstitutional” in two 
main ways. First, they could be contrary to explicit limits to the 
amending power contained in the constitutional text itself. 
Second, they could be contrary to the fundamental principles in 
which the constitution rests. Although unamendability does not 
necessarily need to be judicially enforceable, the doctrine of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments is usually 
accompanied by the idea that courts can declare the invalidity of 
an unconstitutional amendment. Each form of unamendability—
explicit and implicit—involves its own particular problems, but 
they both raise a common set of questions. Yaniv Roznai’s 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of 
Amendment Powers, is, to my knowledge, the first book to deal 
with these problems and questions from both a theoretical and 
comparative (global) perspective. The book introduces readers to 
the subject through a rich historical account of the development 
of the doctrine, examines the current practice of explicit and 
implicit amendability in different jurisdictions and regions, 
advances a theory about the nature and scope of the amending 
power, and examines the question about whether the doctrine 
should be judicially enforced. In this brief review, far from 
providing a detailed summary of those discussions, I will make 
three comments that are directly connected to some of the main 
 
 1. Assistant Professor, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya 
(IDC). 
 2. Associate Professor, Victoria University of Wellington. 
1 - COLO ́N-RI ́OS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/18 11:57 AM 
2 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:1 
 
arguments presented by Roznai. In so doing, I hope to contribute 
to the debate that this important book is likely to continue to 
generate among constitutional theorists and comparative 
constitutional lawyers. 
My comments apply to both forms of amendability, unless 
otherwise indicated. I will suggest, first, that the doctrine has an 
uneasy relationship with conservative and radical democratic 
notions of constitutionalism; second, that the distinction between 
the secondary and primary constituent power, defended through 
the book, is difficult to sustain in some contexts; and, third, that 
given the fact that most constitutions do not authorise their own 
democratic replacement, the judicial enforcement of the doctrine 
can only be justified exceptionally. Although these comments 
challenge some aspects of Roznai’s approach, it will also be clear 
that I largely agree with the argument presented in the book. 
I would like to begin where the book ends. Roznai notes in 
his conclusion, and I agree, that the alleged paradoxical character 
of the very idea of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment 
disappears once the doctrine is “correctly construed” (p. 233). As 
long as the ordinary amending power (the secondary constituent 
power) is understood as distinct from the exclusive constitution-
making power of the people (the primary constituent power), there 
is nothing paradoxical in noting that the former cannot be used to 
change the existing constitution in ways so fundamental that 
amount to the creation of a new one. As I have noted elsewhere,3 
however, the doctrine carries with it a different sort of paradox. 
On the one hand, particularly in the context of implicit 
unamendability, it is a profoundly conservative doctrine: it is 
about preserving the basic principles on which the constitution 
rests, just because they are the basic principles in which the 
constitution rests (that is, not because, for example, they are 
particularly good principles). 
In this respect, the doctrine is conservative for the worst 
reason possible: it wants to preserve what exists just because it 
exists. The doctrine, however, also has a radical democratic 
potential. To the extent that it only applies to the amending 
power, it is not binding on “the people,” who can change or 
replace those basic principles at any moment. Since the exercise 
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of the primary constituent power has traditionally been 
understood as extra-legal or extra-constitutional, what the 
doctrine suggests is that political acts that are sufficiently massive, 
popular, or participatory, can legitimately operate besides (or 
perhaps despite) a constitution’s amendment rule. Thus, on the 
one hand, this is a very conservative doctrine; on the other, it is a 
very radical one. In his book, Roznai explores both sides of that 
paradox. Indeed, as he shows, in the United States, conservative 
lawyers and politicians were the ones who, in the past, tended to 
defend the notion of implicit limits on the amending power. For 
example, John Calhoun, the pro-slavery politician and 
commentator, argued that an amendment that is “inconsistent 
with the character of the constitution and the ends for which it was 
established—or with the nature of the system” (p. 41)—would be 
ultra vires the amending power. At the same time, Roznai 
recognizes the potential revolutionary character of the doctrine: 
“The fear of revolution is a legitimate concern that should act as 
a warning for constitutional designers to use unamendability 
carefully” (p. 131). This is why, he writes, the “further 
development of how the primary constituent power may 
peacefully ‘resurrect’ and change even unamendable 
constitutional subjects” is important (p. 131).4 
It could be argued that the doctrine is only conservative 
superficially, that in the last instance, it is its radical nature that 
characterizes it. The reason why certain basic principles cannot be 
changed through the ordinary amendment process, this argument 
would hold, is precisely because those principles were established 
by the people, the primary constituent power, at the time the 
constitution was created. Accordingly, government officials who 
have been authorised by the people to amend “the constitution” 
cannot use that power, a secondary constituent power, to alter the 
basic principles in which the constitution rests. That would 
amount to the creation of a new constitution, not as the 
amendment of an already existing one. The problem with this 
argument, which Roznai largely defends in his book (and I have 
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defended in my own work)5 is that, in the context of certain 
constitutions, it is based on an assumption that is empirically false. 
As a matter of actual constitutional practice, many constitutions 
are not adopted through processes that could be reasonably 
described as amounting to an “act of the people,” but by ordinary 
legislatures (sometimes even without a referendum) acting 
through processes similar to the ones that characterise ordinary 
amendment rules. For example, to say that a particular provision 
of the United States Constitution should be unamendable by the 
U.S. Congress and the state legislatures acting through Article V 
because it reflects a fundamental principle adopted by “the 
people,” is to assume that the Constitution was adopted through 
an inclusive and participatory process. There could be other 
reasons why a particular provision should be considered 
unamendable, but the idea that it should be unamendable because 
of its alleged popular origin is untenable in some contexts. 
The apparently radical character of the doctrine, in the case 
of many constitutions, would thus rest in the (false) assumption 
that the existing constitution was created by “the people,” which 
would lead to the not necessarily correct conclusion that it should 
therefore be put out of the scope of the secondary constituent 
power. The implication would be, and this leads me to my second 
comment, that the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments should only apply in the context of constitutions that 
have been created through highly democratic procedures. In 
other words, constitutions that can somehow be seen as having 
been created by “the people.” A hypothetical example would be 
useful to illustrate this point. Suppose that a democratically 
elected parliament adopts a new constitution with no form of 
direct popular intervention. The new constitution contains an 
amendment rule that authorises its revision through a process that 
involves: (1) a referendum on whether a Constituent Assembly 
shall be elected to draft a new constitution; (2) a special election 
in which the members of that body are selected; and (3) a final 
referendum in which the draft constitution can be ratified or 
rejected. Both the initial creation of a constitution by parliament 
and its amendment by a Constituent Assembly could be described 
as democratic, but let’s suppose that most observers would tend 
to view the second process as more democratic (as will probably 
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be the case). To avoid unnecessary complications, let’s also 
suppose that the constitution contains an explicit limit on the 
amending power which prohibits any amendment that abolishes 
the upper house of the legislature. 
If a Constituent Assembly operating under the process 
described above decided to abolish the upper house, would it be 
appropriate for a court to invalidate its decision on the basis that 
“the people,” in the exercise of their primary constituent power, 
decided that the upper house of parliament cannot be abolished 
through the amendment process? This example, in my view, 
suggests that distinguishing between the primary and the 
secondary constituent power on the basis that the former 
necessarily has a better claim to represent, or to speak on behalf 
of, the people, is highly problematic in some cases. Roznai is 
aware of this problem and provides a solution (the “spectrum of 
constitutional amendment powers”) that at first sight appears 
satisfactory: “The more similar the characteristics of the 
secondary constituent power are to those of the democratic 
primary constituent power . . . the less it should be bound by 
limitations, including those of judicial scrutiny, and vice versa” (p. 
162). Nevertheless, the question still remains whether the 
distinction between the secondary and the primary constituent 
power can be sustained at all in cases where the amendment 
procedure is more “popular” or “democratic” than—or, perhaps, 
as popular or democratic as—the process used in the actual 
creation of the existing constitution. However unusual such a case 
may be in practice, it forces us to think about the extent to which 
the democratic potential of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments depends on what actually happened 
when the constitution was created and on the procedures (if any) 
that it provides for its own replacement. 
The final comment, which follows directly from the previous 
point, is about whether the doctrine of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments should only apply when there is a 
possibility to legally trigger an exercise of primary constituent 
power. My example above was from a certain perspective 
deceptive, because it could be argued that in cases where the 
constitution authorises the convocation of a Constituent 
Assembly as the one I described earlier, the doctrine of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments simply does not 
apply. That is to say, when a popularly elected Constituent 
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Assembly proposes fundamental constitutional changes that are 
later ratified in a referendum, it should be understood as a proper 
means for the exercise of the primary constituent power (and, 
therefore, as “unbound by prior constitutional rules” (p. 233)). 
This would be particularly true in cases where there is a tiered-
amendment rule, and (in a way consistent with Roznai’s spectrum 
of constitutional amendment powers) one could say that the less 
demanding process would be subject to limits while the more 
demanding (both in terms of difficulty and degrees of popular 
involvement), would not. But all this raises, in my view, a basic 
question about the judicial enforcement of the doctrine. Should 
judges be authorized to apply the doctrine of unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments in situations in which there are no 
legal means available for the exercise of the primary constituent 
power? In those cases, legally speaking, the court would have the 
very final word as to what counts as acceptable constitutional 
content. 
Roznai does not agree with such an approach. He thinks, in 
my view correctly, that a judicial declaration of invalidity should 
not necessarily close the door to fundamental constitutional 
changes: “Unamendability does not block all the democratic 
paths for constitutional change, but simply announces that one 
such path, namely the amendment process, is unapproachable for 
amending certain constitutional subjects” (p. 189). Since 
unamendability only limits the secondary constituent power, 
Roznai continues, “it is entirely consistent with ‘the people’s’ 
sovereignty, as manifested by the primary constituent power 
through which they can constitute a new constitutional order” (p. 
190). Under this view, when a court declares a constitutional 
amendment invalid, it does not negate but vindicates the people’s 
will (p. 193). The problem, as suggested above, is that this is not 
the reality of most constitutional orders (including constitutional 
orders that have already embraced the notion of judicially 
enforceable unamendability). Modern constitutions rarely 
contain a mechanism, outside the ordinary amendment rule, 
which involves popular participation to an extent that it can be 
seen as a proper means for the exercise of the primary constituent 
power. In the context of such a (typical) constitution, the judicial 
application of the doctrine would make fundamental 
constitutional changes a legal impossibility. It would seem that a 
system like that would be in some way defective, in the sense that 
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it makes certain rules only changeable through revolution. Given 
the prevailing approach to the exercise of primary constituent 
power, perhaps the judicial enforcement of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments can only be justified 
in a handful of jurisdictions, if at all. 
 
